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sed to determineAbstract
A range of emotional and motivation impairments have long been clinically documented in
people with schizophrenia, and there has been a resurgence of interest in understanding the
psychological and neural mechanisms of the so-called “negative symptoms” in schizophrenia,
given their lack of treatment responsiveness and their role in constraining function and life
satisfaction in this illness. Negative symptoms comprise two domains, with the first covering
diminished motivation and pleasure across a range of life domains and the second covering
diminished verbal and non-verbal expression and communicative output. In this review, we
focus on four aspects of the motivation/pleasure domain, providing a brief review of the
behavioral and neural underpinnings of this domain. First, we cover liking or in-the-moment
pleasure: immediate responses to pleasurable stimuli. Second, we cover anticipatory pleasure
or wanting, which involves prediction of a forthcoming enjoyable outcome (reward) and feeling
pleasure in anticipation of that outcome. Third, we address motivation, which comprises effort
computation, which involves figuring out how much effort is needed to achieve a desired
outcome, planning, and behavioral response. Finally, we cover the maintenance emotional
states and behavioral responses. Throughout, we consider the behavioral manifestations and
brain representations of these four aspects of motivation/pleasure deficits in schizophrenia.
We conclude with directions for future research as well as implications for treatment.
& 2013 Elsevier B.V. and ECNP. All rights reserved.Elsevier B.V. and ECNP. All rights
o.2013.06.007
edu (A.M. Kring),
.
order of authors.1. Introduction
A range of emotional and motivation impairments have long
been clinically documented in people with schizophrenia,
and there has been a resurgence of interest in under-
standing the psychological and neural mechanisms of the
negative symptoms in schizophrenia, given their lack of
treatment responsiveness and their role in constraining
function and life satisfaction in this illness. Negativereserved.
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A.M. Kring, D.M. Barch726symptoms comprise five consensus-based domains: anhedonia,
asociality, avolition, alogia, and blunted affect (Kirkpatrick
et al., 2006). However, conceptual and empirical reviews of
newer (e.g., CAINS; (Kring et al., 2013) or BNSS (Strauss et al.,
2012)) and older (e.g., SANS; (Andreasen, 1982)) interview-
based measures of negative symptoms indicate that a two-
factor model more parsimoniously describes the negative
symptoms (Blanchard and Cohen, 2006; Kimhy et al., 2006;
Messinger et al., 2011). The first factor reflects diminished
motivation and pleasure across a range of life domains; the
second factor reflects diminished verbal and non-verbal
expression and communicative output. Newer measurement
techniques for these two domains—motivation/pleasure and
expression—may better capture the underlying mechanisms
giving rise to negative symptoms (Blanchard and Cohen, 2006;
Kring et al., 2013) and help in developing more effective
treatments. In this review, we focus on the motivation/
pleasure domain, providing a brief review of the behavioral
and neural underpinnings of this domain.
We have argued elsewhere that adopting a translational
approach to research on negative symptoms has and will
continue to give us the greatest purchase toward more
clearly identifying mechanisms of negative symptoms and
developing more effective and targeted treatments (Barch
and Dowd, 2010; Kring and Elis, 2013). Indeed, adopting the
methods, theories, and measures of affective science, as
well as translating from the animal and human affective and
cognitive neuroscience, has propelled us ever closer to
identifying core deficits that give rise to motivation/plea-
sure deficits in schizophrenia and other disorders. Indepen-
dently, we have developed theoretical frameworks to
guide our research on the emotional and motivational
underpinnings of negative symptoms, highlighting how these
deficits necessarily also involve behavior and brain regions
that are crucial for cognitive control. Both of us have
translated animal and human cognitive and affective neu-
roscience research to our models of motivation/pleasure
deficits in schizophrenia. Kring and colleagues have argued
for the importance of characterizing the time course of
emotion to distinguish among anticipatory, consummatory
(“in-the-moment”), and maintenance of emotion respond-
ing (see Fig. 1). Relatedly, Barch and colleagues have argued
for the importance of representations about motivationally
salient incentives necessary to develop and actively main-
tain behavioral plans that are necessary to achieve desired
pleasurable outcomes (see Fig. 2).
In this review, we integrate our approaches to highlight
the latest advances in our understanding of behavioral andMemory for
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Fig. 1 Temporal experience of emotion.brain systems that contribute to diminished motivation and
pleasure in schizophrenia (see Fig. 3). Specifically, we focus
on four common aspects of our models. First, we cover
liking or in-the-moment pleasure, which involves immediate
responses to pleasurable stimuli. Second, we cover antici-
patory pleasure or wanting, which involves a prediction
about a future enjoyable outcome (reward) and/or a feeling of
pleasure in anticipation of that outcome. Third, we address
motivation, which includes a calculation of how much effort is
needed to achieve a desired outcome (reward), a plan of how
to obtain that outcome, and the actual behavioral response
to get the reward. Finally, we cover the maintenance of
emotional states and behavioral responses. Throughout, we
consider the behavioral manifestations and brain representa-
tions of these four aspects of motivation/pleasure deficits in
schizophrenia.2. In-the-moment emotional experience
in schizophrenia
In-the-moment experience in our models refers to the
responses people provide when presented with putatively
positive things. That is, how do people report feeling when
presented with funny pictures, tasty foods, or reward of $5?
This in-the-moment experience is called consummatory
pleasure or “liking” in some human and animal models
(see Table 1). In this section, we review the evidence on the
behavioral and brain responses people with schizophrenia
exhibit when presented with positive stimuli.
Although people with schizophrenia often report limited
experiences of positive emotion during interview based clin-
ical assessments (Horan et al., 2006), behavioral research tells
a different story. Specifically, one of the most well-replicated
findings in schizophrenia research is that people with schizo-
phrenia report experiencing similar (or slightly less) amounts
of positive emotion compared to those without schizophrenia
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Fig. 3 Integrating the temporal experience of emotion with reward to outcome translation (Kring & Barch).
727Motivation and pleasurein the presence of emotionally evocative stimuli (Cohen and
Minor, 2010; Kring and Moran, 2008; Llerena et al., 2012) and
in daily life (Gard et al., 2007; Myin-Germeys et al., 2000;
Oorschot et al., 2009, 2012), regardless of changes in medica-
tion status (Kring et al., 1999a, 1999b). Interestingly, a
number of studies have found that people with schizophrenia
report experiencing more negative emotion to putatively
positive stimuli or events in daily life compared to people
without schizophrenia (Kring and Elis, 2013; Strauss and Gold,
2012; Tremeau et al., 2009; Ursu et al., 2011) (see Cohen and
Minor (2010) for meta-analysis). In short, people with schizo-
phrenia generally report liking or enjoying positive things as
much as do people without schizophrenia even as they may
also report disliking them a bit more.
At least some aspects of liking or in-the-moment experience
appears also appear to be intact at the level of the brain,
though the findings are more variable and complicated by
methodological differences across studies. Brain imaging stu-
dies examining striatal responses to the receipt of expected
monetary rewards in schizophrenia have shown a consistent
pattern of intact responses, regardless of typical or atypical
antipsychotic medication status (Dowd and Barch, 2012; Kirsch
et al., 2007; Simon et al., 2009; Walter et al., 2009). However,
some studies have found abnormal cortical responses to
reward receipt (Schlagenhauf et al., 2009; Walter et al.,
2010; Waltz et al., 2010), particularly when the reward is
unexpected (see also section on prediction error responses in
the striatum). Further, a more mixed picture has arisen in non-
monetary studies in schizophrenia (Crespo-Facorro et al.,
2001; Paradiso et al., 2003), with some evidence for reduced
activation of the insula (Plailly et al., 2006; Schneider et al.,
2007), orbital frontal cortex (OFC) (Plailly et al., 2006) and
striatum (Dowd and Barch, 2010; Grimm et al., 2012; Waltz
et al., 2009).
Two recent meta-analyses that focused on responses to
emotional stimuli (Anticevic et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2012)
reported consistent findings in regards to brain responses to
emotion in schizophrenia, despite using different meta-
analytic techniques. Both meta-analyses included studies that
had the following characteristics: assessed in-the-momentresponses to evocative stimuli; included contrasts between
conditions (emotion condition—neutral condition as well emo-
tion condition—baseline); included between group compari-
sons, and used standardized coordinates. Anticevic et al.
focused primarily on the amygdala, whereas Taylor et al.
examined whole brain activation. With respect to amygdala
activation, an interesting and consistent result was found
across the two meta-analyses. People without schizophrenia
showed greater amygdala activation compared to people with
schizophrenia, but only for contrasts that subtracted activa-
tion during a neutral condition from activation during
a negative condition (Anticevic et al., 2010; Taylor et al.,
2012). In contrast, when examining direct emotion contrasts
(i.e. positive condition—baseline), Anticevic et al. found no
between group differences in amygdala activation. Results
from both meta-analyses suggest (but cannot fully demon-
strate) that under-activation of amygdala in people with
schizophrenia in response to evocative stimuli may reflect
over-activation to the neutral stimuli, and suggest that
responses to negative stimuli themselves are relatively intact.
It remains important to examine responses to positive stimuli
given that most studies included in the meta-analyses to date
have included only negative and neutral stimuli.
Taylor et al. (2012) revealed other regions of activation
that distinguished people with and without schizophrenia,
including less activation in people with schizophrenia in
dorsal medial and dorsolateral PFC, regions activated during
emotion and cognitive tasks. Less activation was also
observed in more posterior brain regions (occipital pole,
fusiform gyrus) among people with schizophrenia, but this
may reflect neural correlates of processing complex facial
stimuli more than emotion per se. Taylor et al. also
examined the potential moderating effects of task type on
observed brain activation differences. As such, they com-
pared implicit tasks (e.g., rate the gender of face) versus
explicit tasks (e.g., rate your emotional experience), and
found that the reduced activation among people without
schizophrenia in amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex
(PFC) was found primarily in implicit tasks. This raises the
question as to whether these non-emotion focused aspects
Table 1 Key terms and concepts.
Term Definition
In-the-moment pleasure
experience (“liking”
or “consummatory
pleasure”)
The responses people provide
when presented with putatively
positive things, such as how
they people report feeling
when presented with funny
pictures, tasty foods, or reward
of $5, or how their brain
responds when presented with
such stimuli
Anticipatory pleasure
(“wanting”)
A prediction about a future
enjoyable outcome (reward)
and/or a feeling of pleasure in
anticipation of that outcome
Prediction error An increase in striatal
(presumably dopaminergic)
responses to unexpected
rewards and a decrease in
striatal responses when
predicted rewards do not occur
Effort computation How much effort is needed to
achieve a desired outcome
(reward)
Value computation How valuable a potential
reward or desired outcome is,
given the current state of the
person (e.g., how valuable is a
bottle of spring water when I
am very thirsty versus when I
just drank a bottle of water)
Reversal learning When presented with a choice
between two stimuli (e.g., door
1 or door 2), learning that a
previously rewarded stimulus
(e.g., door 1) is no longer
associated with reward, and
that the other stimulus is now
associated with reward (e.g.,
door 2)
Goal-directed behavior Selection and execution of
actions necessary to obtain
potentially desirable or
rewarding outcomes that fulfill
a goal (e.g., the experience of
pleasure, or a special outcome)
DLPFC Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
OFC Orbital frontal cortex
DA Dopamine
ACC Anterior cingulate cortex
A.M. Kring, D.M. Barch728of the task may have contributed to the different patterns
of activation.
To summarize, brain imaging studies suggest that people
with and without schizophrenia show comparable brain
activation in striatum to expected reward and amygdala
(more so for negative stimuli relative to baseline) to people
without schizophrenia. Despite these similarities, there is
also evidence for differences in the insula, orbital frontalcortex (OFC) and striatum to positive non-reward stimuli,
though these results are quite mixed with an equal number
of studies finding intact responses to positive stimuli in
these regions. There also appear to be differences in
activation of regions that are also associated with cognitive
control, including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).
If in-the-moment pleasure or liking at the level of self-
report and the brain are relatively intact in schizophrenia,
at least to expected stimuli, where might things go awry?
Research from both of our groups as well as other labora-
tories suggests that more pronounced deficits emerge at the
intersection of emotion, cognition, and behavior. In the next
sections, we review the fairly consistent behavioral and
neural evidence for deficits in anticipation, maintenance,
and motivated behavior in schizophrenia.3. Anticipatory pleasure
Much of what is enjoyable or pleasurable about life is
derived from thinking about the future. Will I enjoy having
sushi for lunch? Will I be happy with my new job? Will I enjoy
the family reunion? Thinking about pleasure or enjoyment in
the future is broadly referred to as anticipatory pleasure or
“wanting.” Anticipatory pleasure involves a prediction
component (how much will I enjoy dinner with my family?)
as well as a feeling of pleasuring knowing that something
positive is going to happen in the future (I am so excited, I
can’t wait to start my new job next week). It is in the
domain of anticipatory pleasure that people with schizo-
phrenia appear to have particular trouble.
Indeed, we have argued for and demonstrated anticipatory
pleasure deficits in schizophrenia (Barch and Dowd, 2010;
Dowd and Barch, 2010, 2012; Gard et al., 2007; Kring and
Caponigro, 2010; Wynn et al., 2010). In the animal literature,
anticipatory pleasure has been characterized as “wanting” and
distinguished from “liking” or in-the-moment pleasure experi-
ence (Berridge, 2004; Berridge and Robinson, 1998). Compared
to controls, people with schizophrenia are less likely to
anticipate or predict that future events will be pleasurable,
are less likely to experience pleasure in anticipation of things
to come, and thus may be less motivated to seek out
pleasurable experiences (see Fig. 3).
Neuroscience research on how animals and people trans-
late these predictions and feelings about possible future
rewards or enjoyable things into behavioral responses
(Berridge, 2004; Schultz, 2004, 2007; Schultz et al., 1997;
Wallis, 2007) has informed our work in schizophrenia.
Specifically, animal work has demonstrated that the mid-
brain dopamine (DA) system, particularly the projections to
ventral and dorsal striatum mediates reward prediction and
wanting (Berridge, 2004; Schultz, 2007). Many DA neurons in
the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area respond to
stimuli that predict reward, as well as to the rewarding
stimuli themselves, with the degree of response depending
on reward predictability. If the reward was not predicted,
then DA neurons fire strongly (positive prediction error); if a
predicted reward does not occur, then there is a transient
depression in DA neuron firing (negative prediction error)
(Schultz, 1992, 2004, 2007, 1993, 1997). When neutral
cues are repeatedly associated with rewards, over time
729Motivation and pleasureDA neurons begin to fire to the predictive cues rather than
to rewards themselves (Schultz, 2007). Human fMRI studies
have found activation of ventral and dorsal striatum, major
targets of midbrain dopaminergic neurons, in response to
cues that predict expected reward (Knutson et al., 2001,
2000) as well as both positive and negative prediction error
responses (Abler et al., 2006; McClure et al., 2003). A
prominent, though slightly different theory, emphasizes the
role of the DA-learning process in transferring incentive
salience (i.e., the positive feelings in human terms) from
the reward itself (e.g., tasty dinner) to the reward-
predicting cues (restaurant review in the paper), thus
imbuing these cues with motivational properties themselves
(e.g., a “wanting” response (Berridge, 2004)).
fMRI studies of the prediction part of anticipatory pleasure
in schizophrenia have reported reduced ventral striatum
activity to cues predicting reward in unmedicated people with
schizophrenia (Esslinger et al., 2012; Juckel et al., 2006b;
Kirsch et al., 2007; Nielsen et al., 2012; Schlagenhauf et al.,
2009), as well as in people taking typical, but not atypical
antipsychotics (Juckel et al., 2006a; Schlagenhauf et al., 2008;
Simon et al., 2009; Walter et al., 2009). Importantly, a number
of these studies also showed a relationship between negative
symptom severity and deficits in ventral striatal activity to
cues predicting reward (Dowd and Barch, 2012; Juckel et al.,
2006b; Waltz et al., 2010).
Prediction errors: A number of studies have also examined
the role of the striatum in reward prediction by looking at
prediction error responses—an increase in striatal (presum-
ably dopaminergic) responses to unexpected rewards and a
decrease in striatal responses when predicted rewards do not
occur. Some studies have found reduced prediction error
responses in the striatum to rewards among people with
schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Jeon and Polich, 2003;
Morris et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2008), coupled with
enhanced prediction error responses to neutral stimuli
(Murray et al., 2008) or to unsurprising rewarding stimuli
not expected to elicit prediction errors (Morris et al., 2012).
By contrast, Gradin found reduced prediction error responses
in the caudate, but increased activation associated with
expected reward value in the ventral striatum (Gradin et al.,
2011). Waltz et al. (2009) found evidence for reduced
positive prediction error responses in a range of regions that
included the striatum (dorsal and ventral) as well as insula,
but relatively intact negative prediction errors in these same
regions. Dowd and Barch (2012) found intact prediction error
responses in schizophrenia, but in cortical regions rather than
striatal regions during a Pavlovian task (neither the controls
nor the people with schizophrenia showed prediction error
responses in the striatum). Taken together, these findings
suggest evidence for reduced prediction error responses to
unexpected outcomes in some striatal regions. It is not clear
whether these abnormal responses reflect altered computa-
tions of the likelihood that stimuli will lead to reward (e.g.,
more of a problem anticipating the likelihood that a stimulus
will lead to a reward) or a problem in updating the values
associated with a stimulus at the time that the reward
occurs. Further work will be needed to tease these apart
and to clarify the reasons for abnormal prediction error
responses in schizophrenia.
In summary, the literature on anticipatory pleasure in
schizophrenia suggests more evidence for impairment thanthe literature on in-the-moment “liking” responses. People
with schizophrenia self-report a reduction in the anticipa-
tion of pleasure in future events. Further, they show
reduced responses in the striatum to cues that predict the
future occurrence of reward, as well as abnormal responses
to the receipt of rewards that are unexpected. A key
question is then how this might influence the selection of
behaviors that may or may not lead to future rewards.
4. Approach motivation and behavior:
computing value, computing effort,
and goal-directed behavior
Why are people motivated to seek out some rewards or
positive outcomes but not others? Barch and Dowd (2010)
have argued for the importance of distinguishing two key
components of motivation. First, people compute the value
of a reward or desirable outcome (value computation: do I
really enjoy or desire that cup of tea?), and second, people
compute how much effort or “work” it will take to get that
reward or outcome (is it worth walking the two blocks to get
the tea?). These two components of motivation then sup-
port goal-directed behavior—that is, the action or behavior
need to achieve a desired goal or outcome/reward. In this
section, we review the behavioral and neuroscience evi-
dence for deficits in value computation, effort computation,
and goal-directed behavior. First, we describe the current
animal and human neuroscience findings on brain regions
supporting theses motivation processes.
Neuroscience research has found that value computation
is mediated in part by orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Padoa-
Schioppa and Cai, 2011; Rudebeck and Murray, 2011). In
animal work, value computation includes the positive/
rewarding properties of an outcome as well as the internal
state of the organism (e.g., value of juice when thirsty
versus not) (Rolls et al., 1989), which is akin to the human
work on feeling pleasure in anticipation of a desired out-
come (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Value computation also
includes the delay before an outcome occurs (Roesch and
Olson, 2005; Rudebeck et al., 2006b), the available out-
comes (e.g., tea versus wine after a hard day) (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006), and the
changing contingencies associated with a stimulus (a pre-
viously rewarded response is now punished, such as when
the rules change in a game you are playing) (Cools et al.,
2002; Dias et al., 1996). Some researchers have described
the OFC as being involved in “working memory for value”,
or the ability to maintain, update, and integrate different
sources of information about value over a short period of
time (Frank and Claus, 2006; Wallis, 2007).
Effort computation (i.e., determining the cost of engaging
in whatever actions it will take to obtain an outcome) involves
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) with contributions
from DA input from nucleus accumbens and related forebrain
circuitry (Botvinick et al., 2009; Croxson et al., 2009;
Salamone, 2007; Salamone et al., 2007). For example,
research has shown that ACC lesions, as well as depletions
of accumbens DA, lead animals to choose low effort but low
reward options over higher reward, but higher effort options
(Rudebeck et al., 2006a, 2007, 2006b; Rushworth et al., 2007;
Salamone, 2007; Salamone et al., 2007; Walton et al., 2007).
A.M. Kring, D.M. Barch730Integrating these computations alongside anticipatory
pleasure propels the ability to generate and execute action
plans necessary to achieve the valued outcome. A number
of researchers have discussed the role of the lateral PFC
(Braver and Cohen, 1999; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Wallis,
2007) in relation to goal-directed behavior (i.e., behavior
that is enacted in the service or obtaining a goal or reward,
such as walking the two blocks for an afternoon coffee).
Indeed, other research and theory on DLPFC function has
indicated that the DLPFC plays a role in top-down control of
cognitive processing and provides a bias signal that helps to
facilitate goal-directed behavior (Miller and Cohen, 2001).
In addition, people who have lateral prefrontal lesions show
impairments in developing an “action plan” for enacting
goal-directed behavior (Manes et al., 2002; Zalla et al.,
2001). Finally, other studies show that increases in DLFPC
activity mediate “motivated” cognitive control enhance-
ments that occur with the provision of incentives in both
animals (Kobayashi et al., 2006; Krawczyk et al., 2007;
Sakagami and Watanabe, 2007; Watanabe, 1996), and
humans (Beck et al., 2010; Jimura et al., 2010; Savine and
Braver, 2010; Tsujimoto and Sawaguchi, 2005). In short,
intact DLPFC function may be necessary to translate infor-
mation about value into goal representations and to main-
tain such information so that is can be implemented as goal-
directed behavior to achieve the desired outcome.
In schizophrenia, behavioral studies indicate that people
with schizophrenia have deficits in value computation (Brown
et al., 2013; Gold et al., 2012, 2008; Heerey et al., 2008). In
addition, indirect evidence for deficits in value computation
comes from studies showing deficits on two tasks that rely upon
the OFC: (1) reversal learning (Ceaser et al., 2008; Elliott et al.,
1995; Oades, 1997; Pantelis et al., 1999; Turnbull et al., 2006;
Tyson et al., 2004; Waltz and Gold, 2007) but see (Hutton et al.,
1998; Jazbec et al., 2007; Joyce et al., 2002) for exceptions;
and (2) the Iowa Gambling task (Kester et al., 2006; Kim et al.,
2009; Lee et al., 2007; Martino et al., 2007; Premkumar et al.,
2008; Sevy et al., 2007; Shurman et al., 2005; Yip et al., 2009),
but some exceptions (Evans et al., 2005; Rodriguez-Sanchez
et al., 2005; Turnbull et al., 2006; Wilder et al., 1998). Both
tasks require the integration of information about rewards and
punishments across trials to then update value representations
appropriately. There is also evidence for structural and func-
tional changes in OFC in schizophrenia (Baare et al., 1999;
Bertollo et al., 1996; Gur et al., 2000; Pantelis et al., 2003;
Plailly et al., 2006), some of which are related to negative
symptoms (Baare et al., 1999; Gur et al., 2000). In sum, there is
growing evidence from the behavioral literature on schizophre-
nia for deficits in value computation in schizophrenia, as well as
good evidence from the behavioral literature for deficits in
tasks thought to reflect OFC function in schizophrenia, and at
least some data suggesting that OFC changes may be related to
negative symptoms.
Research in schizophrenia is just beginning to examine
effort computation. For example, Gold et al. (2013) presented
people with and without schizophrenia a computer task that
allowed participants to choose between a more effortful
response for a bigger monetary reward or a less effortful
response for a smaller monetary reward while also varying the
likelihood of receiving a reward (50% versus 100%). Interest-
ingly, people with schizophrenia who had more negative
symptoms were less likely than controls to expend more effortwhen the reward was certain (i.e., 100%). The authors
speculated that the certainty of reward may have also made
the effort expenditure more salient. In short, people with
schizophrenia may have computed that the effort was not
worth it when it was most salient. Barch et al. (in revision)
used a similar task developed by Treadway et al. (2009) to
study effort computation as well. They also found that people
with schizophrenia were less likely to exert greater effort as
reward magnitude increased and as rewards became more
likely. Further, they found that a reduction in the willingness
to exert effort was associated with poor community and work
function among people with schizophrenia.
Goal-directed behavior has been studied more frequently in
schizophrenia, alongside deficits in DLPFC function. As noted
earlier, an experience sampling study found that people with
schizophrenia anticipated that goal-directed activities would be
less enjoyable than did people without schizophrenia and they
subsequently engaged in these types of activities less often
(Gard et al., 2007). Thus some of the motivational impairments
observed in schizophrenia may reflect, at least in part,
problems in translating computations of value and effort into
goal representations that can be used and maintained in DLPFC
to guide goal-directed behavior. One way of examining this
question is to determine how motivational incentives impact
cognitive performance, potentially via modulation of DLPFC
activity. Several studies suggest that people with schizophrenia
are not able to improve their performance on cognitive tasks
when offered monetary incentives (Green et al., 1992; Hellman
et al., 1998; Roiser et al., 2009; Vollema et al., 1995); while an
equal number suggest at least some evidence for improvement
with reward (Kern et al., 1995; Penn and Combs, 2000;
Rassovsky et al., 2005). There is also older clinical work on
the use of token economies in schizophrenia that suggests
functioning can be improved through an explicit reward system,
though token economies provide a number of “external”
supports for maintaining reward related information that could
compensate for deficits in the ability to translate reward
information into action plans. Further, there is strong evidence
from a variety of sources for impairments in DLPFC function in
schizophrenia (Glahn et al., 2005; Minzenberg et al., 2009; Van
Snellenberg et al., 2006). However, to date, there are no fMRI
studies examining whether or not anticipated reward or
incentives modulate DLPFC activity during cognitive control or
working memory tasks in schizophrenia.5. Maintenance, integration, and updating
Not only is maintenance crucial for enacting goal-directed
behavior, but also it is important for later encoding of
pleasurable experiences. Indeed, human neuroscience find-
ings in healthy people suggest that our ability to anticipate
the future relies upon our ability to remember the past
(Schacter et al., 2007, 2008), with a core network of brain
regions, including areas of the medial prefrontal and medial
temporal cortex, supporting both abilities. Thus, when we
predict whether or not we will enjoy the latest novel by a
favorite author, we likely draw upon our past experiences
with the authors’ novels to guide our predictions. Maintain-
ing emotional experiences as they occur likely facilitates
the development of memories for these experiences (Kring
and Caponigro, 2010). There is a very robust literature
731Motivation and pleasuresuggesting that people with schizophrenia have deficits in
active maintenance of non-emotional information in work-
ing memory, with a number of meta-analyses summarizing
this evidence (Forbes et al., 2009b; Lee and Park, 2005). As
such, it is should not be surprising that there is also
evidence from psychophysiological and fMRI studies suggest-
ing that people with schizophrenia have difficulty holding on
to prior emotional experiences. For example, people with
and without schizophrenia showed comparable and differ-
entiated eyeblink responses to a startle probe during
picture viewing (i.e., larger blinks to negative pictures,
smaller blinks to positive pictures), yet just 2.5 s after
the picture was removed from view, the schizophrenia
group no longer showed this differentiated pattern of blink
responses, though the control group did (Kring et al., 2011).
Similarly, in an fMRI study, people with and without schizo-
phrenia exhibited comparable activation of visual, amyg-
dala, and prefrontal cortical regions, consistent with intact
in-the-moment emotional experience. However, during the
12.5 s period after pictures were removed from view, there
were marked differences between groups across prefrontal
and limbic regions, and reduced activity in the DLPFC was
positively correlated with anhedonia (Ursu et al., 2011).
Such findings are consistent with the hypothesis that people
with schizophrenia may have difficulties actively maintain-
ing emotional experiences. Further, an event related poten-
tial study found that people with schizophrenia exhibited
comparable responses early and mid-way during picture
viewing but the schizophrenia group differed late in the
picture viewing window, suggesting that maintenance def-
icits may begin even before stimuli are removed from view
(Horan et al., 2010). An important unanswered issue for
future research is whether deficits in the maintenance of
emotional or rewarding experiences are simply another
manifestation of deficits in working memory more broadly.6. Conclusions and unanswered questions,
and future directions
Taken together, results from our review are consistent with
the notion that “in-the-moment” experience of pleasure is
relatively intact in schizophrenia. That is, people with
schizophrenia report experiencing as much pleasure as do
people without schizophrenia in the presence of putatively
positive stimuli, and they show comparable brain activa-
tion, at least in response to expected positive stimuli or
outcomes. Nevertheless, people with schizophrenia also
report experiencing more negative emotion in response to
positive stimuli and they also show different versus activa-
tion in response to unexpected outcomes suggesting that all
is not completely intact when it comes to in-the moment
responding or the liking aspect of our model. In addition,
there is evidence that value computation is impaired in
schizophrenia. Further, there is growing and consistent
evidence that people with schizophrenia have deficits in
both behavior and neural responses associated with the
anticipation of future rewarding or pleasurable experi-
ences, as well as with responses to unexpected rewards.
In addition, they have impairments in value and effort
computation and goal-directed behavior that are related
to functioning in the world. There is suggestive evidencethat the active maintenance of emotional information and
the ability to use prior emotional experience to guide
current behavior is also impaired, though the linkages
between this and other cognitive deficits (i.e., working
memory) have yet to be worked out.
To illustrate the ways in which breakdowns in the interplay
among generation and anticipation of goals, value and effort
computations, and maintenance may contribute to impair-
ments in goal-directed behavior in schizophrenia, consider the
following scenario. A person with schizophrenia may report
enjoying brownies and show both behavioral and neural
evidence of consummatory pleasure while eating brownies.
However, she may not be able to engage in the behaviors
necessary to obtain or make more brownies (Barch and Dowd,
2010; Kring and Moran, 2008). Planning, purchasing, preparing
or baking the brownies requires ongoing maintenance or
retrieval of the prior emotional experience of pleasure while
consuming a brownie, as well as maintenance of contextual or
cue information that should trigger associations about the
food's rewarding properties. Such anticipation and mainte-
nance of emotional information should guide the volitional
pursuits and actions over time that may lead to such a reward
(in this case intake of delicious food). An intact reward
valuation and prediction system is necessary for this set of
behaviors to take place, and deficits in these functions in
schizophrenia may reduce the ability of appetitive or pleasure
cues to drive behavior. However, these functions also depend
on the intact ability to maintain pleasure cues, experiences or
context over time—a process that may be reliant on working
memory and cognitive control, which are compromised in
schizophrenia (Barch and Dowd, 2010; Ursu et al., 2011).
Thus, deficits in reward prediction may be made worse by
deficits in the ability actively maintain information about
rewards or pleasure, which may extend beyond simple
appetitive stimuli to more abstract rewards.
What is needed next is research that directly tests the
ability to use and maintain internal representations of
emotional experience and reward information to modulate
behavior and brain function in schizophrenia, along with
work that characterizes links between deficits in these
abilities and everyday function in this illness. Further,
more work is needed to understand the role that effort
computations may also play in motivation impairments in
schizophrenia. It may be that even when people with
schizophrenia are able to generate or maintain representa-
tions of emotion or motivation, alternations in computing
effort to reward valuation may inhibit the development of
goal directed action plans that people need in order to
pursue and obtain desired outcomes. Of course, these
mechanisms may interact—difficulties in the anticipation
of pleasurable outcomes may reduce the “reward” part of
the value or effort computation, skewing such computations
towards less willingness to exert effort if there is less
perception of rewards due to representation and mainte-
nance impairment. Further, much work is still needed to
understand how these various deficits interact with medica-
tions and the course of illness. There is good evidence that
negative symptoms are present in currently unmedicated
people and in people who have never taken medication.
However, it has been more difficult to conduct the experi-
mental studies parsing mechanisms in unmedicated people,
and thus future research is needed to disentangle the
A.M. Kring, D.M. Barch732effects of the disease versus the effects of medication on
these different mechanisms.
Another direction for future research is to examine how
the components of the model we articulate here are or are
not deficient in depression. The temporal course of reward
processing impairments in schizophrenia and depression
may be different, with more evidence that abnormal reward
processing may be more trait-like in schizophrenia and more
state-like in depression (Blanchard et al., 2001). Further,
there is a growing evidence that the nature of reward
processing abnormalities in depression may be different
that those found in schizophrenia. For example, there is
much more evidence for abnormal responses to the receipts
of rewards in depression (Epstein et al., 2006; Eshel and
Roiser, 2010; Forbes and Dahl, 2012; Forbes et al., 2009a;
Pizzagalli et al., 2008). However, there is also evidence for
some similar abnormalities, such as reduced effort compu-
tation (Treadway et al., 2012). Unfortunately, very few
studies have directly compared different aspects of reward
processing in schizophrenia and depression (though see
Gradin et al. (2011)), and this will be a critical path for
future research that will help us understand the structure of
motivational impairments in relationship to varying mani-
festations of psychopathology.
Nonetheless, the intriguing research coming from the
work on the mechanisms driving negative symptoms in
schizophrenia is beginning to point towards specific proces-
sing and neural systems that could be ripe targets for
interventions, both at a pharmacological and a psychological
level. It is interesting to speculate as to possible interven-
tions that may help to remediate such impairments in reward
prediction, effort allocation, and maintenance of information
about emotional and/or reward information, with the hope
of potentially improving quality of life and work and com-
munity function. There may be a range of pharmacological
interventions that could manipulate the dopamine system in
ways that could enhance reward processing, though the
challenge is to ensure that such pharmacological approaches
do not also increase positive symptoms, given the role of
dopamine in the pathophysiology of the disorder. Further,
there may be behavioral interventions that could be effec-
tive as well. Indeed, Grant et al. (2012) modified cognitive
therapy for schizophrenia to emphasize goals, including
changing beliefs that are associated with negative symptoms
(Grant and Beck, 2009) and interfere with goal attainment as
well as practice in action planning to achieve long- and short-
term goals. Results from a randomized trial indicated that
people with schizophrenia who received cognitive therapy
had lower avolition at the end of treatment as well as better
overall functioning. Other behavioral interventions have
shown promise in increasing anticipatory pleasure (Favrod
et al., 2010) and maintenance (Johnson et al., 2011), but
these studies were very small, open trials that are in need of
replication with larger samples and in randomized trials.
Additional treatment development work is needed, how-
ever, to more fully translate the findings we have reviewed
here into behavioral interventions. For example, as
described above, the work of Kring and colleagues suggests
that emotional responses in schizophrenia may not be
sustained when stimuli are not present in the immediate
environment (Kring et al., 2011; Ursu et al., 2011) and
other work suggests that people with schizophrenia havedifficulties understanding which cues predict future rewards
when stimuli. In other words, people with schizophrenia seem
to have problems bridging the gap between the occurrence of
stimuli that predict reward and the future obtainment that
reward through the use of internal representations that can
support temporally extended goal directed activities, suggest-
ing a common mechanism that may be contributing to a range
of impairments in motivation in this disorder. If so, then
environmental supports or cues that remind people with this
illness about rewarding outcomes over time may increase the
likelihood of increased effort allocation to engage in the
behaviors necessary to eventually achieve such goals. While
speculative, such hypotheses help translate these experimen-
tal findings into interventions for motivational impairments in
schizophrenia.
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